(4) No person other than the registered owner thereof shall be entitled to transfer a registered charge by a registered disposition; but, subject to the maintenance of the right of such owner, unregistered interests in a registered charge may be created in the same manner and with the same incidents, so far as the difference of the subject matter admits, in and with which unregistered estates and interests may be created in registered land.

80. No person other than the parties thereto shall be deemed to have notice of the contents of any instruments other than those mentioned in the existing register of title of the parcel of land or which have been duly entered in the books of the office kept for the entry of instruments received or are in course of entry.

It is also provided by the Ontario statute (e) as follows:

45. A transfer of registered land, made without valuable consideration, shall be subject, so far as the transferee is concerned, to any unregistered estates, rights, interests or equities subject to which the transferer held the same; but otherwise, when registered, in all respects, and in particular as respects any registered dealings on the part of the transferee, shall have the same effect as a transfer of the same land for valuable consideration.

The section just quoted is a feature of the Ontario statute which distinguishes the land titles system in force in Ontario from, that in force in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and the Northwest Territories. Under the latter system it seems probable that a voluntary transferee from the registered owner is entitled to substantially the same protection as a transferee for value, provided the voluntary transferee takes in good faith, or, in other words, that as in the case of the transferee for value so in the case of the voluntary transferee, fraud alone will deprive the transferee of the protection of the statute.

(e) Ont. s. 45; John Macdonald &Co. v. Tew, 1914, 32 O.L.R. 262.

It is true that in some of the leading cases language is used which supports the view that the main object of the land titles system is to protect.a transferee in good faith and for value from the registered owner (f), but such language may be due to the fact that usually the person who is entitled to claim the protection of the system as a transferee from the registered owner in good faith is also a transferee for value and that a voluntary transferee in good faith entitled to priority over persons claiming under earlier instruments is somewhat rare. The absence of valuable consideration is doubtless an element to which a court would attach some weight in considering whether a transfer is taken in good faith.

In fact, with slight exceptions (g), the statutes do not explicitly recognise any distinction between transferees for value and voluntary transferees.

In Coventry v. Annable (h) the plaintiff purchased land from the beneficial owner W. J. "White, the title being vested in Kitty Ann White, and received a transfer from the latter Subsequently Kitty Ann "White conveyed the land to the defendant who registered his transfer and received a certificate of title. The trial judge held that the defendant was not guilty of fraud, but that the transfer to him was without consideration and therefore his title was no better than that of his transferor and that he held as trustee for the plaintiff. On appeal, however, the majority of the Supreme Court of

(f). Notably in the passage from Gibbs v. Messer,. [1891] A.C. 248, quoted in Sec. 92, supra; cf. Assets Co. v. Mere Roihi, [1905] A.C. 176; Brown v. Broughton, 1915, 25 M.R. 489, at p. 501, 24 D.L.R. 244, at p. 252.

(g) E.g., the Manitoba statute (s. 84) permits an action for the recovery of land to be brought by a person deprived of land by fraud against a person deriving his right or title otherwise than bona fide for value from or through a person registered through fraud. Cf. Sask. s. 159; Alta. s. 104; N.W.T. s. 142.

(h) 1911, 4 S.L.R. 175, 425, affirmed sub nom. Annable v. Coventry, 1912, 46 Can. S.C.R: 573, 5 D.L.R. 661.

Saskatchewan found that the defendant's conduct was fraudulent and affirmed the judgment on this ground. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on the same ground, Idington J. and Anglin J. both taking care to say-that they are not to be understood as dissenting from the view of the law expressed by the trial judge.

In Coventry v. Annable (i) Wetmore C.J. said:

"Having found as stated, the learned Judge held that Annable not being a purchaser for value was in no better position than Kitty Ann White, and that he held the land in trust for the plaintiff. He came to this conclusion under the authority of Chomley v. Fire-brace (j) and Crow v. Campbell (k). In Fish v. Bryce (I) Johnstone J. laid down the following: 'There is no distinction between a proprietor who has got on the register by fraud and one who has got there under a voluntary transfer, as against the rightful owner. In either case the registered owner may be declared a trustee for the rightful owner.' That case was decided under sec. 130 of the Territories Real Property Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 51, which is as follows: 'Nothing contained in this Act shall take away or affect the jurisdiction of any competent court on the ground of actual fraud, or over contracts for the sale or other disposition of land, or over equitable interest therein.'

"If that section or one similar to it had been on the statute book when the transfer in question was made, I do not think that I would have much difficulty in agreeing with the conclusion which the trial Judge reached herein. But at the time that the transfer was executed the Land Titles Act, 1894, was in force, and the corresponding section to sec. 130 of the Territories Real Property Act was very materially different. The words 'or over equitable interest therein' had been eliminated, and the words 'for which a certificate of title had been granted' substituted (see sec. 130 of the Land Titles Act), and that section was carried forward and forms sec. 4 of the Land Titles Act, 1906 (Sask.). In Turner v. Clark (m) I held that if there was collusion or fraud or the conveyance to the transferee was without consideration, the Court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter, notwithstanding the fact that a certificate of title had issued to such transferee, and I held this under the Saskatchewan

(i) i911, 4 S.L.R. 425, at pp. 431, 432.

(j) 1878, 5 V.L.R. 57, 1 Hunter's Torrens Title Cases 98.

(k) 1884, 10 V.L.R. 186, 1 Hunter's Torrens Title Cases 87.

(I) 1909, 2 S.L.R. Ill, at p. 118.

(m) 1909, 2 S.LR. 200, at p. 204.

Act In view of the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Assets Co. v. Mere Roihi (n) I am by no means sure that what I so laid down stands on as solid grounds as what is above stated to have been laid down by my brother Johnstone in Fish v. Bryce. I express no opinion as to the effect this judgment of the Judicial Committee may have had in this case from the standpoint only that no consideration was given for the transfer, as I have put my judgment on another ground."